“Germany pursued no aim either in Europe or elsewhere which could only be achieved by means of war.

Austria-Hungary’s only aim was to maintain the status quo. Her first intention of rectifying her frontiers at Serbia’s expense was immediately abandoned at Germany’s insistence, and even Sazanov was convinced of her territorial déintéressement by her definite statements. . . .

France aimed at recovering Alsace Lorraine, and many leading French politicians also hoped to annex the Saar basin, whilst Russia aspired to possession of Constantinople and the Straits, both Powers knowing well that these aims could not be achieved without a European war.

Germany’s preparations for war were on a considerably smaller scale than those made by France, having regard to the political constellation, her geographical position, the extent of her unprotected frontiers, and the number of her population. From 1913 onwards, even her actual numerical piece strength was less, in respect of white troops, quite apart from the steadily increasing strength of the French coloured troops.

As compared with Russia’s armaments, those of Austria-Hungary were absolutely inadequate.

The Franco-Russian allies were far superior to the Central Powers as regards to the amount of war material, as well as the man power at their disposal.”

—Count Max Monteglas, 1920s-1930s

“Germany pursued no aim either in Europe or elsewhere which could only be achieved by means of war.

Austria-Hungary’s only aim was to maintain the status quo. Her first intention of rectifying her frontiers at Serbia’s expense was immediately abandoned at Germany’s insistence, and even Sazanov was convinced of her territorial déintéressement by her definite statements. . . .

France aimed at recovering Alsace Lorraine, and many leading French politicians also hoped to annex the Saar basin, whilst Russia aspired to possession of Constantinople and the Straits, both Powers knowing well that these aims could not be achieved without a European war.

Germany’s preparations for war were on a considerably smaller scale than those made by France, having regard to the political constellation, her geographical position, the extent of her unprotected frontiers, and the number of her population. From 1913 onwards, even her actual numerical piece strength was less, in respect of white troops, quite apart from the steadily increasing strength of the French coloured troops.

As compared with Russia’s armaments, those of Austria-Hungary were absolutely inadequate.

The Franco-Russian allies were far superior to the Central Powers as regards to the amount of war material, as well as the man power at their disposal.”

—Count Max Monteglas, 1920s-1930s

“Germany pursued no aim either in Europe or elsewhere which could only be achieved by means of war.

Austria-Hungary’s only aim was to maintain the status quo. Her first intention of rectifying her frontiers at Serbia’s expense was immediately abandoned at Germany’s insistence, and even Sazanov was convinced of her territorial déintéressement by her definite statements. . . .

France aimed at recovering Alsace Lorraine, and many leading French politicians also hoped to annex the Saar basin, whilst Russia aspired to possession of Constantinople and the Straits, both Powers knowing well that these aims could not be achieved without a European war.

Germany’s preparations for war were on a considerably smaller scale than those made by France, having regard to the political constellation, her geographical position, the extent of her unprotected frontiers, and the number of her population. From 1913 onwards, even her actual numerical piece strength was less, in respect of white troops, quite apart from the steadily increasing strength of the French coloured troops.

As compared with Russia’s armaments, those of Austria-Hungary were absolutely inadequate.

The Franco-Russian allies were far superior to the Central Powers as regards to the amount of war material, as well as the man power at their disposal.”

—Count Max Monteglas, 1920s-1930s

“The situation is critical in the extreme. In fact it is now absolutely clear that to delay the uprising would be fatal.

With all my might I urge comrades to realize that everything now hangs by a thread; that we are confronted by problems which are not to be solved by conferences or congresses (even congresses of Soviets), but exclusively by peoples, by the masses, by the struggle of the armed people.

The bourgeois onslaught of the Kornilovites shows that we must not wait. We must at all costs, this very evening, this very night, arrest the government, having first disarmed the officer cadets, and so on.

We must not wait! We may lose everything!

Who must take power?

That is not important at present. Let the Revolutionary Military Committee do it, or “some other institution” which will declare that it will relinquish power only to the true representatives of the interests of the people, the interests of the army, the interests of the peasants, the interests of the starving.

All districts, all regiments, all forces must be mobilized at once and must immediately send their delegations to the Revolutionary Military Committee and to the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks with the insistent demand that under no circumstances should power be left in the hands of Kerensky and Co…. not under any circumstances; the matter must be decided without fail this very evening, or this very night.

History will not forgive revolutionaries for procrastinating when they could be victorious today (and they certainly will be victorious today), while they risk losing much tomorrow, in fact, the risk losing everything.
. . .
It would be an infinite crime on the part of the revolutionaries were they to let the chance slip, knowing that the salvation of the revolution, the offer of peace, the salvation of Petrograd, salvation from famine, the transfer of the land to the peasants depend upon them.

The government is tottering. It must be given the death-blow at all costs.”

—Vladimir Lenin, Call to Power, 1917

“The situation is critical in the extreme. In fact it is now absolutely clear that to delay the uprising would be fatal.

With all my might I urge comrades to realize that everything now hangs by a thread; that we are confronted by problems which are not to be solved by conferences or congresses (even congresses of Soviets), but exclusively by peoples, by the masses, by the struggle of the armed people.

The bourgeois onslaught of the Kornilovites shows that we must not wait. We must at all costs, this very evening, this very night, arrest the government, having first disarmed the officer cadets, and so on.

We must not wait! We may lose everything!

Who must take power?

That is not important at present. Let the Revolutionary Military Committee do it, or “some other institution” which will declare that it will relinquish power only to the true representatives of the interests of the people, the interests of the army, the interests of the peasants, the interests of the starving.

All districts, all regiments, all forces must be mobilized at once and must immediately send their delegations to the Revolutionary Military Committee and to the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks with the insistent demand that under no circumstances should power be left in the hands of Kerensky and Co…. not under any circumstances; the matter must be decided without fail this very evening, or this very night.

History will not forgive revolutionaries for procrastinating when they could be victorious today (and they certainly will be victorious today), while they risk losing much tomorrow, in fact, the risk losing everything.
. . .
It would be an infinite crime on the part of the revolutionaries were they to let the chance slip, knowing that the salvation of the revolution, the offer of peace, the salvation of Petrograd, salvation from famine, the transfer of the land to the peasants depend upon them.

The government is tottering. It must be given the death-blow at all costs.”

—Vladimir Lenin, Call to Power, 1917

“The situation is critical in the extreme. In fact it is now absolutely clear that to delay the uprising would be fatal.

With all my might I urge comrades to realize that everything now hangs by a thread; that we are confronted by problems which are not to be solved by conferences or congresses (even congresses of Soviets), but exclusively by peoples, by the masses, by the struggle of the armed people.

The bourgeois onslaught of the Kornilovites shows that we must not wait. We must at all costs, this very evening, this very night, arrest the government, having first disarmed the officer cadets, and so on.

We must not wait! We may lose everything!

Who must take power?

That is not important at present. Let the Revolutionary Military Committee do it, or “some other institution” which will declare that it will relinquish power only to the true representatives of the interests of the people, the interests of the army, the interests of the peasants, the interests of the starving.

All districts, all regiments, all forces must be mobilized at once and must immediately send their delegations to the Revolutionary Military Committee and to the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks with the insistent demand that under no circumstances should power be left in the hands of Kerensky and Co…. not under any circumstances; the matter must be decided without fail this very evening, or this very night.

History will not forgive revolutionaries for procrastinating when they could be victorious today (and they certainly will be victorious today), while they risk losing much tomorrow, in fact, the risk losing everything.
. . .
It would be an infinite crime on the part of the revolutionaries were they to let the chance slip, knowing that the salvation of the revolution, the offer of peace, the salvation of Petrograd, salvation from famine, the transfer of the land to the peasants depend upon them.

The government is tottering. It must be given the death-blow at all costs.”

—Vladimir Lenin, Call to Power, 1917

“The men are exhausted and will no longer go into the trenches. Entire regiments refuse orders. They say openly that they will not continue a war that brings only hunger and death. The army is dissolving before our eyes; discipline has vanished. If decisive measures are not taken, the front will cease to exist, and the state itself will be in danger.”

—General Mikhail Alekseyev, 1917

“The men are exhausted and will no longer go into the trenches. Entire regiments refuse orders. They say openly that they will not continue a war that brings only hunger and death. The army is dissolving before our eyes; discipline has vanished. If decisive measures are not taken, the front will cease to exist, and the state itself will be in danger.”

—General Mikhail Alekseyev, 1917

“The men are exhausted and will no longer go into the trenches. Entire regiments refuse orders. They say openly that they will not continue a war that brings only hunger and death. The army is dissolving before our eyes; discipline has vanished. If decisive measures are not taken, the front will cease to exist, and the state itself will be in danger.”

—General Mikhail Alekseyev, 1917

“The men are exhausted and will no longer go into the trenches. Entire regiments refuse orders. They say openly that they will not continue a war that brings only hunger and death. The army is dissolving before our eyes; discipline has vanished. If decisive measures are not taken, the front will cease to exist, and the state itself will be in danger.”

—General Mikhail Alekseyev, 1917

“We must learn to trade. We must allow a certain freedom of exchange. The peasants must have an incentive to produce. Without this, we shall not obtain grain, and the workers in the towns will starve. We must retreat in order to make a new and stronger advance later.”

—Vladimir Lenin, 1921

“We have gone ahead at full speed in the matter of collectivization. But some local officials, carried away by success, have begun to apply methods of compulsion. They have forgotten that the collective farm movement must rest on the voluntary principle. Such distortions can only cause harm to the cause of socialism.”

—Joseph Stalin, Pravda, 1930

“We must learn to trade. We must allow a certain freedom of exchange. The peasants must have an incentive to produce. Without this, we shall not obtain grain, and the workers in the towns will starve. We must retreat in order to make a new and stronger advance later.”

—Vladimir Lenin, 1921

“We have gone ahead at full speed in the matter of collectivization. But some local officials, carried away by success, have begun to apply methods of compulsion. They have forgotten that the collective farm movement must rest on the voluntary principle. Such distortions can only cause harm to the cause of socialism.”

—Joseph Stalin, Pravda, 1930

“We must learn to trade. We must allow a certain freedom of exchange. The peasants must have an incentive to produce. Without this, we shall not obtain grain, and the workers in the towns will starve. We must retreat in order to make a new and stronger advance later.”

—Vladimir Lenin, 1921

“We have gone ahead at full speed in the matter of collectivization. But some local officials, carried away by success, have begun to apply methods of compulsion. They have forgotten that the collective farm movement must rest on the voluntary principle. Such distortions can only cause harm to the cause of socialism.”

—Joseph Stalin, Pravda, 1930